Saturday, September 30, 2006

Was the Cold War the inevitable outcome of WW2?

Its not my turn to write a presentation or essay but I felt I needed the practice in tackling the question anyway. I hope I will be excused for using my blog to splurge my thoughts!

I spent a long time pulling apart the question and thought there are maybe a couple of issues at stake -- was a Cold War inevitable or not? and was it the result of WW2 or not? My initial instinct was to try and argue that it was not inevitable at all but reading further I became less certain of that. I decided that the inevitability part of the question might by about following an orthodox or traditional view versus a revisionist view of how the Cold War came about. Gaddis argues that Stalin's personality plays an important role in sparking the conflict and so I initially thought this pointed to its non-inevitability. Rereading my notes on Schlesinger, however, I saw the strength of the inevitability argument. My conclusion is that: conflict was inevitable after WW2, but the Cold War was driven by variable (non-inevitable factors) like Stalin's personality...

The Second World War created the economic and political circumstances for tensions to develop between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In Poland and Germany it also provided the physical location for those tensions to come to a head. However, this essay will argue that the Cold War was not the inevitable result of WW2. Rather it grew out of resurfacing animosities and was driven by other factors, including the personality of its key actors.

After decades of separation, the Grand Alliance was formed by common interest in securing Germany’s surrender and in maintaining post-war cooperation to prevent the re-emergence of the German threat. (1) This sustained them through the WW2, despite U.S. and British unease over Soviet atrocities (c.f. Katyn (2)) and Stalin’s motives (The threat of a separate peace). The suspicion was mutual (Stalin’s belief that there was a delay in opening the second front) and arguably never let up.

In 1945, there was hope that the various interests of the wartime allies could be accommodated, for instance in a “three policemen” concept. (3) Relations, however, became further strained by actions that either side considered threatening to national security. Stalin grew suspicious as the U.S. and Britain came increasingly closer over Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean, while his failure to adhere to the Yalta promises rang alarm bells in Washington and London. The U.S.’s temporary nuclear monopoly also played a role. The defeat of Hitler then, meant the glue keeping the Grand Alliance together dissolved.

It is worth considering what each party wanted from the situation at the end of WW2 before asking whether they would inevitably collide.

As the war ended, Britain and the U.S.S.R. were counting the cost of the conflict in financial and human terms. Both countries continued to seek ways of shoring up their spheres of influence (as they had done in Yalta with the “naughty document” (4) – the percentages agreement”). Schlesinger makes the point that Britain, like the U.S.S.R, had probably always tended towards the spheres of influence concept. (5) Britain, which was about to lose India to independence in what started the decline of its empire, wanted to maintain its influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, primarily as a means of securing its economic interests there (through Suez Canal for instance), but also to keep intact its colonies in Africa and elsewhere. As Britain shifted closer towards the U.S. post Potsdam (6), the Cold War’s battle lines were forming. (7)

The United States sought an end to nationalist power politics and the notion of spheres of influence that it believed was responsible for two world wars. As Schlesinger notes, this conveniently ignored the U.S. influence in Latin America at the time. (8) Roosevelt, following Wilson, hoped to export the U.S. concept of universalism, a new world order based on the notions of self-determination and international, free market trade. There were also significant economic considerations. The Great Depression was fresh in U.S. memories and fearing another crash, Washington sought to put in place through the World Bank and IMF the means to stabilise Europe’s economy. This would lessen the risk of economic collapse spreading to the U.S. economy and also ensure that the conditions of hyperinflation and chronic unemployment that buoyed Hitler in the 1930s would not be repeated. There was also a sense of moral obligation to act in Europe, spurred on by pressure from the émigré lobbies in Washington. (9)

After a series of invasions via Poland, Stalin primarily sought to secure the Soviet borders and wished to do so by creating a belt of friendly nations to the west of the U.S.S.R. He also sought territory at the expense of Poland and ports in the Mediterranean. His nation had been decimated by the war and paid a high price in human and material costs. He sought reparations from Germany and was resentful of persistent resistance to the “liberating” Red Army in Poland. This ignored of course the appalling treatment meted out to the Poles, their resentment of the Molotov/Ribbentrop pact and their fear of emerging from one occupation to immediate succumb to another. Stalin, due in part to his inherent insecurity, never relinquished the notion of spheres of influence, meaning that a collision course with the U.S. was set. What is arguable is the extent to which his aim to control neighbouring countries was ideological (born of the notion of a permanent people’s revolution) or truly in defence of national security. (10)

The case of Poland showed that the fate of third nations was subordinated to domestic political interests and questions of national security. It was clear that Stalin was not going to accept a Polish government which could resist his influence (11) and that he would seek to secure the passage through Poland which had in the past been used to invade his country. (12) Britain and the United States equally stood to lose credibility at home if they did not act.

A realist explanation of the origins of the Cold War would identify the need for territorial expansion and an innate quest for power among the key players as the two main determinants behind the conflict. This would then imply that whatever efforts were made at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam by the three major powers to reach an agreement on the make-up of post-war Europe, their desires to exert or maintain control over countries beyond their borders would inevitably bring them into conflict.

Taking into account factors such as personality and the influence of domestic opinion mean that identifying the origins of the Cold War becomes more complicated. However, it is perhaps a more accurate reflection of the factors which escalated the tensions between the western allies and the U.S.S.R. into the Cold War.

As Young and Kent suggest the external projections of capitalism and communism were a reflection of their leaders’ needs to keep themselves in power. This points to the importance of domestic politics and leaders’ personalities when considering the origins of Cold War.

“Thus foreign policy goals reflect elite ambitions in the form of state preoccupations with power and expansion as linked to status rather than security. Domestic goals reflect elite needs to preserve the socio-economic order that secures their position and secures its acceptance through the portrayal of ideological challenges as external threats.” (13)

As Gaddis argues, the principal reason why the Grand Alliance crumbled was Stalin’s insistence on equating security with territory. (14) He argues that Stalin’s own personal insecurity permeated Soviet society and was also projected outwards in the form of an antagonistic and expansionary foreign policy. Not only did this bring the U.S.S.R. in to conflict with its former allies, but it also ironically increased the risk of insecurity in the Eastern European states which Stalin was attempting to secure. The hostility which the Red Army faced put Stalin and Communism on the defensive in those countries and demanded an iron-fisted rule which guaranteed that the U.S. could only oppose what was happening. This mismatch between the coercion needed by the Soviets and the U.S. methods caused an imbalance which only righted itself when the wall fell.

“The resulting asymmetry would account, more than anything else, for the origins, escalation, and ultimate outcome of the Cold War.” (15)

Stalin’s behaviour then was largely responsible for creating the conditions which led to the Cold War by provoking the U.S. to the point where they felt compelled to contain the perceived threat he presented. Gaddis argues that the U.S. delay in accepting this need for containment (16) shows that they were still willing to consider coexistence despite their long-held ideological differences.

In conclusion, the perceived needs of the various players and the circumstances they found themselves in 1945 can explain many of the sources of conflict. However, the Cold War was not the inevitable outcome of WW2 since the escalation in tensions required to reach that point was dependent on variable factors such as personality and domestic concerns.

(1) Young, J.W. and Kent, J, International Relations Since 1945, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 52
(2) The Katyn Massacre, Bruce Kennedy, CNN Interactive, http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/01/spotlight/index.html (accessed Sept. 29, 2006)
(3) Pechatnov, V O, (date??) The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain, online: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=321 (accessed 23/09/2006)
(4) Jenkins, R, Churchill, Pan, 2001, p. 760
(5) Schlesinger Jr, A., Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, 1967, pp.23-52
(6) Young, J.W. and Kent, J, ibid, p. 63
(7) Young, J.W. and Kent, J, ibid, p. 64 (After London: “The diplomatic battleground which was to become a Cold War was thus being laid out in power political terms.”)
(8) Schlesinger Jr, A., ibid
(9) Conversations from Yalta; source material from WiWM. F.D.R: "It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland."
(10) Young, J.W. and Kent, J, ibid, p. 27
(11) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, The Conferences of Cairo and Tehran, Dept. of State, Washington, 1961. (accessed via kcl.ac.uk on Sept. 23, 2006)
(12) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, Dept. of State, Washington, 1955. (reproduced in Young, J.W. and Kent, J. 2004)
(13) Young, J.W. and Kent, J., ibid, p. 23
(14) Gaddis, J.L., We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, 1997, Oxford University Press, p.15
(15) Gaddis, J.L., ibid, p.17
(16) Gaddis, J.L., ibid, p.22


Friday, September 29, 2006

Some thoughts from Unit 2.1

Another brain emptying post, I am afraid. These are some bits and bobs I thought might be of use in thinking about the influence that personality, or rather Stalin's personality (after Gaddis), plays.

Pechatnov
The article is significant in what it tells us about Soviet thinking at the end of the War, the implications this has for the argument of inevitable conflict and also the fact that the three diplomats findings were passed over by Molotov. One could draw the inference as result, like Gaddis, that it was Stalin not Soviets per se and not Communism, who contributed to the conflict.

The conclusions Pechatnov draws are that, to a greater or lesser extent, all three diplomats believe in the primacy of maintaining Soviet interests in terms of a sphere of influence over neighbouring countries. They are equally interested in a post-war solution to the German question, and indeed the Japanese question, which would see their wartime enemy incapacitated and enfeebled as a political entity or through economic reparations, or both.

Maisky wants a greater influence for Soviet interests in China and sees the U.S.S.R. as an increasingly important centre of gravity for neighbouring countries. Gromyko pushes the notion that U.S. universalism, seen from the Soviet standpoint as a thinly veiled attempt to prise open new markets and therefore feed the U.S. need for economic growth, would present opportunities to a Soviet bloc rich in raw materials but in need of external technical and financial support.

Most significantly, argues Pechatnov, is that, in a show of unity which ran counter to the thinking within in the Kremlin at various points during the war, the correspondents also maintain that the best means of achieving the Soviet Union’s post-war wishes is by continuing the wartime cooperation with the United States and Great Britain.

For this to work, however, each corner of the triangle has to be independent and not combine with another against the third -- this requires then that the U.S. and Britain will ultimately be at loggerheads with one another, the inevitable Anglo-American contradiction (or as others suggest Soviet fantasies of capitalist fratricide). That the opposite occurs is then an explanation for Cold War polarisation.

“This "three policemen" formula of cooperation was thought able to provide for the three major strategic imperatives of the USSR: keeping Germany and Japan down, keeping the Soviet Union in the big council of the world, and legitimizing the USSR's post-war borders and sphere of influence.

"This notion of a multilateral, realpolitische mindset among senior Soviet advisors at a key moment in the Cold War’s gestation, begs the questions of what might have happened if Molotov, let alone Stalin, truly took them by their word.” (1)

Instead, as Pechatnov notes, the influence of the three, which was arguably never that great, was on the wane shortly after the end of World War Two.

Schlesinger

This is not really related but it serves to show that the notion that personality has a significant role to play, may only really apply to non-democratic systems.

In his analysis of revisionist thinking, Schlesinger challenges the idea (from Alperowitz of Nuclear diplomacy) that F.D.R.’s death marks a shift in U.S. foreign policy when the relatively inexperienced (as Gaddis says ill-informed) Truman entered the Oval Office:

“While the idea that Truman reversed Roosevelt’s policy is tempting dramatically, it is a myth.”(2)

(1) Pechatnov, V O, (date??) The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain, online: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=321 (accessed 23/09/2006)
(2) Schlesinger Jr, Arthur, Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, 1967, pp.23-52

Some early learning points

I know its early days, but I was thinking about learning experiences after working through the documentation from the first unit. I think if I note these down, then I will keep coming back to them and hopefully remember the damn things for next time!

Some early learning points:
-- when reading TAKE NOTES based on the text and not what you are thinking.
-- when reading WRITE DOWN THE PAGE REFERENCES.
-- its never too early to start reading.
-- read before you think.
-- think before you write.

Just had to get that off my chest before I could move on!!

Tuesday, September 19, 2006

The Fog of War

Finally, I got around to watching the The Fog of War, the 2003 documentary film based on an extended interview with Robert S. McNamara.

It has been criticised for not pushing the technocrat McNamara to confront his culpability in letting the Vietnam War continue. He argues that a) it was the president's decision, and that b) as ex-defense secretary and head of the World Bank he could not interfere or express himself even after leaving/being ejected from office.

It does, however, provide some -- at least for me -- interesting insights in to the relationships between JFK (and later LBJ) and McNamara and other key advisors. I was particularly interested to hear recordings of JFK's ExComm talking about the Cuban crisis and the fact that former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn (Tommy) Thompson, was able to sway JFK's thinking on Khrushchev's motives.

McNamara frankly admits that this "empathy with the enemy", one of the 11 lessons which film maker Errol Morris extracts from McNamara's recollections, was lacking in Vietnam.

Some quotes:

-- Quoting Khrushchev on Cuba: "We and you ought not to pull on the ends of a rope which you have tied the knots of war. Because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied."
-- "There will be no learning period with nuclear weapons; you make one mistake and you destroyed a nation."
-- "We saw Vietnam as an element of the Cold War and not what they saw it as: a civil war. We did not know them well enough to empathise with them."

And finally, this one:

Describing how his wife-to-be needed to order stationery before their wedding day and asked him what his middle initial S stood for:

McNamara: "It's Strange."
Wife: "I know it's strange. But what is it?"

Monday, September 18, 2006

More details, more pictures

In response to Sergio's requests that we add a bit more to these blogs, here are a couple of pictures of me in the Swiss mountains. This first one is above Lake Zug. It was freezing cold beneath the clouds and glorious on top.




Another of a different hike, this one in the Swiss engadine, in the deepest south of the country, nearly on the Italian border.



And one to go in the profile.

Saturday, September 16, 2006

Browsers, bloglines and Refworks

I've been following the technical help threads with sympathy. Initially I was finding some conflicts between some of the software and my Mac's Safari browser. So I ditched it in favour of Firefox which is great. It has sensible bookmarks and a great tab system meaning you can have several things open at the same time, all within the same browser.

As a journalist, I also cannot believe that I wasn't using bloglines already -- I always knew that RSS feeds had the potential to be a useful device to keep tabs on what was going on my beat, but had never got around to setting one up. I have now and its proving very useful. Trouble is, I was too enthusiastic I think at the start and am going to have to trim down my subscriptions... I had 492 new posts to read this morning!

I completed both the Information Literacy and Induction modules. Information Literacy proved to be very useful. I was unsure what to expect but the various introductions it gives to the software and resources available are first class.

Having got to grips with the various pieces of software, I have started to explore the the rest of the resources that are available to us as distance learning students. It's pretty impressive.

Locating the Mats Berdal article was problematic until I realised there was a version of the journal that you didn't have to pay for. The others were easy to find on the database which suggests that the Information Literacy module had sunk in after all.

Broswing that led me to start digging around for journal articles relating to media and war, and war reporting, which is my real interest and what motivated to choose this course. There is plenty more out there too so its a good job I got the Refworks account to start storing them all I suppose. Like Stefan here I would be interested to hear what students who have had experience using refworks think of the system. The only time I have had to deal with a bibliography was as an undergrad and I had an electric typewriter.

All in all, an interesting first week!

Tuesday, September 12, 2006

Introduction

Hi and welcome to my blog.

My name is Tom. I am a 28-year-old journalist. I live and work in Berlin. I am originally from the UK but I've spent the past five or so years in Austria (Vienna), Switzerland (Zurich) and Germany (Frankfurt and now Berlin).

I am looking forward to studying again and have spent the last couple of weeks reading some of the texts recommended on the reading list. Another batch is on its way from amazon.co.uk as I write. Their second hand book service is great. As a result of all the books, I had to spend the weekend building a new desk (thank you, IKEA) to sit them all on.

So, now I'm ready: books piled up, laptop configured, blog created.

Look forward to speaking to you all.