New World Order - the Davos Edition

Long time, no blog.
I was watching coverage of Davos closely this year and enjoyed this from the AFP on the search for a definition of the new world order between the skiing and the debauched parties.
The link came via the IISS website.

24 January 2008: AFP

By Giles Hewitt

DAVOS, Switzerland, Jan 24 2008 - The spectacular rise of China and India coupled with a decline in US influence has prompted heated debate in Davos this year over possible scenarios for a new world order.

While the United States remains the undisputed military superpower, experts participating in the annual gathering of the world's political and business elite have highlighted its waning ability to set the global agenda on its own.

And with the UN Security Council struggling to provide a consensus on just about any major issue, the question of what nation, group of nations or international institution could command a leading role on the future world stage was floated to a widely varying response.

The only real point of agreement was that the current fluidity in the balance of world power carries a serious threat of instability and conflict, as well as concerns over how to build an effective international response to extreme abuses of power such as acts of genocide or ethnic cleansing.

"We don't live in a multi-polar world, we live in a non-polar world," said John Chipman, director general of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

While the United States is clearly too strong to stay on the sidelines of world affairs, Chipman argued that it was also "too weak" to implement an agenda without wide international support.

Similarly China, while too strong to be seen as just a developing nation, is unable to shape its regional environment alone and India, while certainly a rising power, remains "diffident" about breaking with its non-aligned principles.

At the same time, Russia has accumulated great economic power, but, "wields it in a way that weakens its reputation and causes immense mistrust," Chipman said.

"The real question is whether the rising powers see themselves as the custodians of an international system and are willing to advance interests that go beyond their national ones," he added.

Wu Jianmin, president of the China Foreign Affairs University, argued that China's reticence to try and set a global agenda should be viewed against the tarnished history of Western interference in the sovereign affairs of other nations.

"You Western countries like to divide the world," said Wu. "You got into the habit of lecturing others. You want people to believe exactly like you. It's impossible."

Some delegates in Davos have predicted the development of a so-called "Chindia" power bloc that would see the two giant Asian neighbours taking a joint role in world affairs.

Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at India's Centre for Police Research said the idea was an understandable one, but flawed.

"Everyone is talking about the rise of China and India. Two nations rising at such an unprecedented speed at the same time in history -- one third of the global population," Chellaney said.

"And it is true to say that how this situation evolves will very much shape security in Asia and beyond.

"But we tend to forget these two countries are new neighbours," he said, pointing back to China's 1951 invasion of Tibet, which had previously provided a buffer zone between the two countries.

"So they have been on a sharp learning curve. Both sides are trying to de-emphasise competition, but reality cannot be ignored. This relationship will be defined by managed competition for years to come."

If the threat of US intervention overseas no longer carries the same weight it did in the past, some voiced concern that a contrary policy of strict non-interference in the sovereign affairs of another state -- often espoused by China -- opened the door to a repeat of such horrors as the genocide in Rwanda.

For Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister and now president of the International Crisis Group, even those countries with a deep resistance to intervention were starting to recognise that egregious crimes against humanity could not go unchallenged.

"There is now the beginning of a global consensus that sovereignty doesn't mean a license to kill, doesn't mean a license to stand back and allow killing of that order to take place," Evans said.

"This is a very real phenomenon, that sovereignty is not what it was and can't be what it was," he added.

Nevertheless, the question remained as to what body could organise such intervention effectively while commanding wide international support.

Many pointed to the need for UN reform that would expand the Security Council and break the stranglehold of the five veto-wielding permanent Council members -- Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States.

Others, like Evans, focused on the potential of informal groupings -- like the Group of Eight industrialised nations -- which lack the executive authority of the Security Council but function well as consensus-building enterprises.

"The trouble with the G8 of course is that it's so selective in its membership," Evans said.

Origins of the New World Order

In case anyone was wondering:

Magazine Desk; 6

On Language; The New, New World Order

BY WILLIAM SAFIRE

1205 words

17 February 1991

The New York Times

Late Edition - Final

14

English

Copyright 1991 The New York Times Company. All Rights Reserved.

"THE OLD ORDER changeth," said the dying King Arthur in Alfred Lord Tennyson's 1842 poem "Morte d'Arthur," "yielding place to new."

He was right. "As I look at the countries that are chipping in here now, I think we do have a chance at a new world order ," President Bush told a news conference on Aug. 30, 1990.

He liked the sound of that phrase. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly a month later, he used it again in urging a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and a redoubling of efforts to stem the spread of nuclear and biological weapons. (The Defense Department lumped nuclear , biological and chemical together under the letters NBC, which is causing great pain at the National Broadcasting Company.) "It is in our hands to leave these dark machines behind, in the dark ages where they belong," Mr. Bush said, "and to press forward to cap a historic movement toward a new world order , and a long era of peace."

As the phrase caught on, Mr. Bush gave it a context of cooperative action to stop aggression. In his 1991 State of the Union Message, he called upon the world "to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order -- where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance."

Where did he get it from? Possibly from James A. Baker 3d, his Secretary of State, who must have heard it often when he served as President Reagan's Treasury Secretary. At a 1985 meeting in Seoul, South Korea, when Mr. Baker lectured countries that "attempt to go it alone," the Peruvian Minister of Finance, Alva Castro, responded with a plea for a " new world order " to replace the International Monetary Fund and assume the debt of third world countries. On May 22, 1986, The Financial Times headlined a story on banking that grew out of this meeting "Towards a New World Order."

Another possible source was Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who told a conference of the World Media Association in the Kremlin on April 11, 1990, according to the Tass translation, "We are only at the beginning of the process of shaping a new world order ." For months, the Soviet leader had been using phrases translated as "unique world order" and "integral world" as well as new world order . Eight months later, he returned to the phrase in rejecting ideas of a loose confederation of Soviet republics, insisting instead on "our remaining a great country, one of the pillars of the new world order that is being built."

For the first time, the leaders of both superpowers were pushing the same phrase. (The closest previous pass at this phenomenon was when Richard Nixon tentatively titled his 1971 economic package the New Economic Plan but was stopped in the nick of time by my own vague recollection that this was the name Lenin used in 1921.) No wonder NWO (pronounced new-oh) caught on; if you resisted the phrase, you were out of order.

But our etymological dig is just getting started on this: where did the leaders of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. pick up the phrase?

It's United Nations diplolingo. In 1974, the General Assembly advanced a plan to redistribute wealth from rich to poor nations it called the New International Economic Order. That turned out to be a nonstarter (a word originating in British racing terminology) and led linguistically to the New World Information and Communications Order, a plan sponsored by Unesco to sanction government control of news organizations. Although the substitution of world for international helped the phrase, that notion was seen in the Western industrialized countries as a censorship scheme and faded away by the late 1980's.

Meanwhile, third world diplomats in the 70's had been pressing for a Law of the Sea Treaty; this was headlined in the May 5, 1975, U.S. News & World Report as "New Order of the Sea." The magazine reported that "American officials would prefer to negotiate a treaty establishing a new world order by general consent." However, this treaty was opposed by the Reagan Administration and its demise was helped by right-wing pundits who kept harping on its unfortunate acronym, LOST. U.S. News liked the phrase new world order and pioneered its use frequently throughout the 70's, although it wrote in that same May 5 issue: "You hear less and less talk these days of 'a new world order .' "

Henry A. Kissinger, as Secretary of State in the mid-70's, was hoping to build what he called "a new structure of stability, a new order of peace." That structural metaphor was picked up later by both Mr. Gorbachev -- perestroika means "restructuring" -- and James Baker, whose "New Architecture" never made it out of the basement. But any use of the term new order , without the interceding word world , is insensitive, because it has connotations that should cause diplomats to shudder.

Die neue Ordnung was Hitler's language for imposing a National Socialist regime throughout Europe, much as co-prosperity sphere was the Japanese phrase for their imperial plan. During a visit to Berlin in 1940, Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov asked Hitler, "What does the new order in Europe and Asia amount to, and what part is the U.S.S.R. to play in it?" Two years later, Stalin was saying, "They have turned Europe into a prison of nations, and this they call the 'new order' in Europe."

But wait -- years before, at the 1932 Democratic convention, F.D.R. pledged "a new deal for the American people." His next line, drafted by Samuel I. Rosenman or Raymond Moley: "Let us all here assembled constitute ourselves prophets of a new order of competence and of courage." The newspapers (led by a political cartoonist, Rollin Kirby) chose new deal over new order .

The last spadefuls of the dig turn up a hyphenated world-order , meaning "an organized existence in this or another world," used by Archbishop Richard Trench of Ireland in 1846: "There is a nobler world-order than that in which we live and move," and finally, the Latin root ordiri , "to lay the warp," or to prepare the loom for the beginning of weaving.

All this digging shows how a famous phrase is not "coined," but rather updated or reconstituted or adapted. This one is worth watching; it may fit the same sort of linguistic need that enshrined cold war and Iron Curtain , which were popularized (but not coined) by Bernard Baruch and Winston Churchill.

The question "Where does new world order come from?" is easy enough to answer, as we have seen; the nice double meaning of new world and world order has yet to be remarked, as if the orderliness of the world is to be the responsibility of the New World, or Western Hemisphere. The next question is "What does new world order mean?" Sorry, that's beyond the phrasedick paygrade. For the definition, we political lexicographers must defer to political leaders; President Bush has not yet made his " New World Order speech."

Mearsheimer - Unit 3.1

In unit 3.1, we are invited to consider in greater detail one of five post-Cold War theories of International Relations. I chose Mearsheimer, mainly because it was the one that I found most intriguing. I had read about Fukuyama and Huntington but Mearsheimer seemed to hark back to another era. I thought he was perhaps trying to bridge a gap between theories of Cold War order and the new world order that emerged after 1989.

Here is the text of my crit. A bit long I know but its quicker to write long than short and time is of the essence! I would be interested to know what any one else thinks of Mearsheimer.

*Mearsheimer*

*John Mearsheimer teaches at the University of Chicago. Born in Brooklyn, NY, he is a West Point graduate (1970). He is proponent of nuclear proliferation and was a critic of the Iraq War. He recently raised controversy with his views on the power of the Israeli lobby in U.S. politics.*

In the post-Cold War debate about international relations, John Mearsheimer’s “Back to the Future” was an important contribution from the neo-realist camp.

At the time, realism, as a school of thought and a means of understanding the interaction between states, had been dealt a blow by the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, neither of which had been predicted by leading realists.

In an age when Bush Snr. was talking about a new World Order, a new multi-lateralist approach to international relations was taking shape, the realist focus on self-help, statism and survival were in question. Realism’s bleak view of human nature and its belief in the inevitability of conflict were out of sync with an American public who were hopeful for the future.

Liberal thinkers were looking at the end of the Cold War as the culmination of a process begun with the enlightenment, Napoleon or the French Revolution: with the decline of Communism in Europe came an affirmation of the values of liberalism, western democracy, market economics and individualism.

“[In the liberals’ eyes,] the possibility of conflict remained, but in an increasingly integrated economic system, the likelihood of its actually occurring was bound to diminish rapidly.”

Mearsheimer countered this idea. Against liberal optimism for a peaceful future, he presented a relatively bleak view of the future stability of the West, arguing that with the collapse of the bipolar system of the Cold War, the long peace of the period 1945-1990 had evaporated.

Mearsheimer’s point of departure is essentially the school of structural realist thought that was born from the Cold War. Taking Kenneth Waltz’s theory of self-help as his starting point, Mearsheimer argues that in a world where anarchy reigns, a state will seek to maximise its power, regionally.

“The goal for states is to dominate the entire system. To put it in colloquial terms, the aim of states is to be the biggest and baddest dude on the block. Because if you're the biggest and baddest dude on the block, then it is highly unlikely that any other state will challenge you, simply because you're so powerful.”

In contrast with traditional realism, where human nature is seen as the cause of conflict, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer see conflict and competition between states as the inevitable result of a lack of any over arching authority.

In this realm of anarchy, Waltz saw states acting to secure their own security, hence the term defensive realism. Mearsheimer’s notions were categorised as offensive realism since he sees states acting to increase their own status and power over their neighbours. No one state will achieve a global hegemony, rather there will be regional leaders and a future condemned to watch them clash.

The inability for global hegemony to develop is drawn back to the stopping power of water in his later work “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.” (Norton, 2001). Critics have questioned this.

The belief that Mearsheimer puts forward in “Back to the Future” is that without the balance of the Cold War bipolarity, Europe is doomed to experience uncertainty and therefore insecurity.

Mearsheimer’s realist approach not only ran counter to prevailing liberal views in the post Cold War environment, but also against the trend towards looking at the world in terms of globalisation.

The importance of states is challenged under globalisation theory, which says that in the modern world, where communications and markets connect countries to a greater degree than ever before, the significance of individual states is declining.

Mearsheimer disagrees with this: The fact of the matter is that the most powerful political ideology in the world today, and it's been the most powerful political ideology in the world for two centuries, is nationalism. Nationalism glorifies the state, and there are all sorts of people out there fighting for a state of their own. The Palestinians are just one example of that. So the state is here to stay for the long term.

A second theory behind globalisation is that cooperation is replacing conflict as the dominating feature of international politics. Mearsheimer rejects this also, arguing the relative peace of the 1990s (there were three wars after all), was in large part that the Americans were playing a pacifying role in Europe and Asia, controlling countries through stationed troops and NATO, while China and Russia were so weak as to not be able to cause trouble.

Much of the criticism that has been levelled at Realism hinges on its retrospective application to the world’s conflicts. It does little to throw forward new perspectives or to develop new theories: since it is rooted in a tradition that extends back to Thucydides, it tends to appear undynami and critics say that it is mathematical in its approach.

There is a logic to Realism but it can’t take into account developments that are not to do with states and their acquisition of power: developments like the spread of concerns about human rights or the emergence of non-state forms of conflict.

In some sense, Mearsheimer himself is aware of this in that while he acknowledges the significance of terrorism in the contemporary environment, he recognises that Realism has little to say about it: “There is no question that terrorism is a phenomenon that will play itself out in the context of the international system. So it will be played out in the state arena, and, therefore, all of the Realist logic about state behavior will have a significant effect on how the war on terrorism is fought. So Realism and terrorism are inextricably linked, although I do think that Realism does not have much to say about the causes of terrorism.”

His views on the strength of states lead him to conclude that China will become a major adversary to the United States should its current rate of economic expansion continue. He also uses the example, controversially, of the state of Israel as an example of how statism gives power to a people, especially when compared with the Palestinian people’s situation.

Mearsheimer’s view of the post-Cold War world paints a relatively bleak view of states’ ability to live side-by-side without conflict in an anarchic world. It discounts international institutions and favours nuclear proliferation as a means of assuring stability. It ran counter to a prevailing spirit in western democracies at the time of its publication that a new era of peaceful cooperation had begun.



Works Cited

Baylis, J., and S. Smith. The Globalization of World Politics. Oxford University Press, 2005.
"Conversation with John Mearsheimer." 2002. .
Hoffmann, Stanley, Robert O. Keohane, and John J. Mearsheimer. "Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe." International Security 15.2 (1990): 191-9.
Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the Future - Instability in Europe After the Cold War." International Security 15.1 (1990): 5-56.

Welcome back

This is the post I made on the welcome back thread:
By way of (re)introduction, I am a British journalist, 29, who has lived in German speaking countries for the last 8 years or so. I used to work at Reuters, as a correspondent in Berlin, Zurich, Vienna and London. I have an BA in languages but I was keen to broaden my horizons with this course. Like James, I don't see the MA as being part of my career development as such, rather it is something I have wanted to do -- for myself -- for a long time. This year brings some changes for me too. I was living in Berlin last year and fitting the course in around a relatively demanding full-time job. I decided to bite the bullet so to speak and do what I been meaning to do for a long-time: go freelance. Four months in, I can safely say its the best decision I have ever made. I now work twice as hard as I did before. And get paid half as much. But I am my own boss, I work from the home I share with my partner in Zurich and I get to choose what I do. One ongoing project for example is translating a book about Afghanistan: it's a good job I did that unit last year....

Third World Part II

Here is a brief summary of the discussion from our group of unit 2.9 -- compiled to make up for my absence for large parts of last week.

The discussion on Afghanistan focussed on the extent to which a discernable Soviet policy towards the Middle East could be seen in this period and whether their invasion of Afghanistan should be considered in relation to this. Giles suggests that Afghanistan should be considered on its own merits as a Soviet attempt, in a limited manner, to re-impose Marxist control on a country in which divisions were apparent.

By highlighting the limited and short-lived nature of the planned operation, it was argued that this was not part of a Soviet Grand Strategy to secure further buffer zones to the South of the Soviet Union or the East of Iran. The Cold War context must not be forgotten, however, and it could be argued – and has been argued by Western observers – that the Soviets were also motivated in part by the failure of SALT II in Senate and the deployment of Pershing Missiles in Germany.

A separate thread considered the U.S.’ wisdom in arming the Mujaheddin and also the consequences or blowback from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for the period of détente which had been witnessed in superpower relations.

A view developed of Soviet policy at the time as being defensive and opportunistic which tied in with the original presentation’s argument that in fact Afghanistan was not part of a Soviet Grand Strategy.

A more nuanced view of the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan, as suggested by Sergio, would be to see it as part of a failed effort by the Soviets, begun by Khrushchev and continued by Brezhnev, to develop a Soviet profile in the Middle East by creating a front against imperalism and thus U.S. interests. A deal of effort and cash was spent for little reward.

The thread on the conflict in the Africa quickly becomes a debate on the nature of Soviet foreign policy in the Cold War and the extent to which a Grand Strategy can be determined from Soviet actions and interventions in the Third World.

Essentially, one can conclude that at this stage in the Cold War the interaction between the two superpowers had become a zero-sum game in which tactical and reactive measures were taken to counter similar by one’s opponent at the expense of strategic and proactive moves which would have appeared more logical with the benefit of hindsight. Observing the Cold War moves from a contemporary perspective reveals a seemingly disjointed narrative.

The need of the two superpowers to exert their influence beyond their immediate geographical vicinity was apparent throughout the 1970s and 1980s. As the extent of the U.S. failure in Vietnam became apparent, there was a feeling in Washington that the U.S. was steadily losing its global influence. This was compounded in Africa with the Angolan Civil War and the Ogaden War.

While the Soviet Union appreciated the dangers represented by the process of de-colonialisation along the southern perimeter of its sphere of influence (broadly speaking), there is little evidence of a Soviet Grand Strategy in the Third World as perceived by the U.S.

Sean argues that Soviet involvement under Brezhnev in Africa in the 1970s (cf the fall of Haile Selassie, Portuguese withdrawal from the continent) was opportunistic, as could be witnessed by the variety of means by which it supplied its aid. That Gorbachev reduced Soviet involvement in the region demonstrates its marginal role in Soviet foreign policy objectives. Dropping the African objective when it became too costly demonstrates that the Soviets were less interested in winning Africans to the Communist cause then acting as a thorn in the side of the west which had traditionally through its role as colonial power held sway in the region. The Soviet design, if there was one, was to stir up conflict and prevent Africa from becoming a pro-western bloc.

In the discussions, Paul draws out the point that throughout the Cold War there is very little evidence to suggest the presence of a grand strategy in Soviet thinking – much of Moscow’s foreign policy decision-making can be seen to be opportunistic, the involvement in Vietnam as a means of drawing the U.S. in being the clearest example.

New Atomic Age

I have attended an interesting conference this week on the future of non-proliferation and weapons control, hosted in Germany. I was there as a journalist of course but it was interesting both from a professional viewpoint as well as from the viewpoint as a student of this course.

The conference was designed as an opportunity for NGOs and academics to discuss non-proliferation with representatives from the German government as well as the United Nations. This was all within the context of the recent warnings that the world is standing before a new atomic age, if indeed a new arms race has not already begun and the eight-point plan put forward by Kissinger et al earlier in the year.

One of the interesting questions posed was the extent to which steps taken by the U.S. and Russia recently, not to mention the UK, to modernise their nuclear weapons arsenals were a blow to the NPT at a time when it is being used to rein in North Korea's military usage of the weapons. The steps by the nuclear nations are sending the wrong message, commentators * in Germany say, especially when one could engage Iran using the same means.

* i hope you appreciate the source!

Re-entry

Just returned from a month of vacation. Managed to place War in the Modern World fairly far back in my mind after a race on December 31 to finish the long essay and the commentary on the Cuban missile crisis simulation. Straight back into the swing of things though with the topic on Strife in the Communist World which I am co-presenting. Its a huge subject area, with so many different avenues to explore and I hope one which will provoke a lively and interesting debate.

While away, I read a great short guide to the Vietnam war: Vietnam: A War Lost and Won by Nigel Cawthorne and also finished Zubok and Pleshakov's Inside the Kremlin's Cold War which gives an interesting version of events based on Soviet archives and thus rounding out my understanding of the period.

Cold War in Asia

Olaf made the following interesting point in my assessing my presentation on the Cold War encroaching on Asia.

O.B: Did you come across any information on how far Asian actors tried to develop policies to avoid entanglement in the Cold War, or was the CW more often seen as a chance to draw an advantage on other’s expense? For Africa there were e.g. the Casablanca group and the Brazzaville group: is there anything similar to that in Asia?

I had not come across many references to it but Best discusses the Asian Relations Conference organised by India and held in New Delhi in 1947. p.310.

A quick search on Jstor yields the following write up from the U.S. journal Social Forces. I think the author’s summary of events shows the concerns prevalent in non-aligned Asian states at that time (and also perhaps in the U.S. given it took three years for the report to get printed).

'The avowed purpose of the conference was to discuss problems common to Asian countries. "Politically of course the most important problem," says the introduction, "was how to terminate foreign domination, direct or indirect, and to achieve freedom to direct affairs in accordance with the will of the people concerned so essential for peace and prosperity.”

'“Economic freedom,” highlighted next, was visualised in terms of transforming colonial economies into national economies, nominally with regard to Asian and international cooperation.

'Aside from European Imperialist relations to the Orient, neither the world power struggle nor such freedoms as those of people, speech, the press and assembly, seemed to have concerned the conference.'

The write up also adds that there was a "painful need" of the study of the transition from colonial to national economies -- a point I try to make in my presentation that the transition to national economic independence is a factor in determining the inroads made by the superpowers in Asia at that time.

Source:
Asian Relations: Being Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March-April, 1947., Review author[s]: Maurice T. Price
Social Forces © 1950 Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press

Destalinisation

Its early, I know, but my thoughts are turning already to the long essay. I am thinking of doing the following question for the long essay this term.

# What was the impact of the death of Stalin on the development of the Cold War?

It would be interesting to hear from any of you who are considering doing the same. If nothing else, we could perhaps share reading lists?

My thoughts on Korea and NSC 68

I was late to the start of this topic. I found the summaries of the discussions by the presenters were really usefully in consolidating the ground that had been covered in the discussions.

Some thoughts.

Sergio’s comments on the motivations behind NSC-68 and the extent to which it showed up a fear of failure on the U.S.’s part helped round out my thinking about this document. It’s a complex thing – on the one hand it’s a clear argument in favour of military superiority as security and has widely been discussed a blueprint for the massive increase in defence spending which was to influence both internal and external relations in the U.S. as well as providing a welcome economic boost to the U.S. and also to its allies. On the other hand the document does show, as Sergio points out, the extent of U.S. “fear” of failure. From a purely emotional perspective, parts of read even more subjectively and with even greater bias then does Kennan’s long telegram about the Soviet system. Its assumption of the coherence of the Communist movement and more to the point the conflation of the Kremlin with the Communist leadership suggests an incomplete understanding of the extent to which Communism was capable of developing strands which were able to operate semi independently of Moscow’s control. Obviously this would become more valid after Stalin’s death.


A couple of observations I made while reading on this subject were as follows:

1-The extent to which NSC68 supports the idea of an increasingly messianic U.S. foreign policy, and reflects a shift from the long-telegram’s advocacy of creating a combined front to contain the communist threat, towards a thoroughly long-term view of the struggle between the free world and the Kremlin’s totalitarian regime, the “Soviet design”. It establishes U.S. moral “superiority” and therefore a justification for taking action which certainly surprised me. The extent to which it emphasises an ideology of the free world and free man in opposition to communism is also illuminating. All of this, I assume, will help explain how the cold war became increasingly globalised and lost the distinctions made between vital and peripheral interests by Kennan (Gaddis).

2-I found the Freedman book on nuclear strategy to be the most useful in filling in the context of how important this document was in the subsequent nuclear arms race. He makes the point that it is turgid and relentless in hammering home its message of the need to increase defence spending (this ties into Sergio’s point as well – those who wrote this were concerned to get their message across). The “bludgeon” of NSC-68 softened up Truman’s administration to greater militarization and the idea that Soviet foreign policy was expansionary and ensured ultimately that when crunch time came and the U.S. was facing the U.S.S.R in its second arena, Korea instead of Germany, Truman was to be more open to its arguments.

An unexpectedly interesting debate to me was why the Korean war did not go nuclear. I found this summary of our debate by Stephen was the most concise: “it was agreed that a realisation occurred that conflicts could be fought by proxy and needn’t be nuclear just because nuclear weapons existed – an important paradigm for the rest of the Cold War.” Freedman talks of the emotional, political and practical reasons why nuclear weapons could not be used during the Korean war. I tend to agree with the notion that it would have been clearly disproportionate. But also, the issues of resources come in to play again.

There was an interesting discussion on this subject in the context of perception and misperception as to the importance of Korea to the two superpowers. A lack of resources was seen by Lowe as one of the major reasons that Korea was not considered a vital interest by the U.S. at this time. MacArthur had to struggle to get the other U.N. countries to commit to Asia at a time when the Cold War was assumed to be focused in Europe. The fact that the U.S. were ambivalent may have prompted or at least contributed to Stalin’s change of heart to Kim on attacking south Korea. That change of heart in turn sounded the alarm in Truman’s administration as to the extent of Soviet ambitions. Korea then went from being a peripheral concern to a proxy war between the superpowers, neither of whom, while facing off in Europe, could afford the loss of credibility which would result from losing another battle.

This state of affairs then sets up the ground for the third-world conflicts where the risk of a nation turning to the other side and the loss of credibility to the losing superpower’s ideological system which ensues becomes one of the defining qualities of each of those later conflicts. That together with the knowledge shared by the leaders of third party states, with nationalist ambitions and whatever else, that the superpowers would step in: the tail wags the dog. The knowledge of what could occur if a vacuum was left, an increasingly likely prospect with the decline in empire, was all that was needed to ensure U.S. and U.S.S.R. involvement in all kinds of seemingly peripheral wars.

Finally, I would also make reference to Mao and the role that he plays in prolonging the war in Korea, together with his desire to boost his own credibility by fighting the Americans, as an example of how interests beyond those of the superpowers would end up influencing their policy. Mao’s apparent manoeuvring in line with the Soviets unsettled the U.S., as Gaddis says, at a time when the were sensitised (perhaps overly so due to NSC-68) to the Red Threat.

On catching up!

Wow. A combination of work and family commitments in the UK kept my away from the online environment for the last week. It was a very enjoyable time I might add and I return with even more vigour than before. However, I see now that logging on regularly and following the discussion is an essential addition to reading in isolation. I am also finding that while I can plough through the texts and formulate ideas, the knack is distilling them. I am heartened to see that everyone's responses this time are more succinct than previously which makes this process of catching up that bit easier. Right, I will get stuck in.

Truman and the bomb

So, I just completed the last parts of the online documentation, and thought I would note down my thoughts on the main factors for Truman's use of the bomb:

-Since it was built it had to be used ($2 bln was a lot of money to spend on sth whose power as a deterant would only stem from evidence of its potency).
-It would end the war
-It would send a clear signal to anyone watching that the U.S. just started a whole new game
-It would save 500,000 U.S. lives... (?)

Not sure about that last one. Time to read Alperowitz I think.

As for the learning points, I can see I have a LONG way to go to get up to speed with some of my learned co-students but I am reassured that this VLE allows me to learn from other people's contributions and comment. Keeping up with the discussion, on top of reading, studying, researching (oh and earning the tuition fee!) is a lot of work but when you get up in the morning to log on before boiling the kettle then the motivation is obviously there.

An interesting article...

My civilian eye spotted this article. I am not sure if its news to any of you non-civilians out there but it was the first time I had really considered the demographic shift in Europe in the context of the Armed Forces. It raises some interesting questions, not least what impact this will have on the source material of those studying War in the Modern World in 2056...

"According to the report, the average European will be 45 years old in 2025 and the pool of 16-30 year olds available for military service will be reduced by 15 percent. Over the same time, the populations of Africa and the Middle East are predicted to grow fast, while their economies lag, leaving a multitude of discontented young Africans and Arabs."

Was the Cold War the inevitable outcome of WW2?

Its not my turn to write a presentation or essay but I felt I needed the practice in tackling the question anyway. I hope I will be excused for using my blog to splurge my thoughts!

I spent a long time pulling apart the question and thought there are maybe a couple of issues at stake -- was a Cold War inevitable or not? and was it the result of WW2 or not? My initial instinct was to try and argue that it was not inevitable at all but reading further I became less certain of that. I decided that the inevitability part of the question might by about following an orthodox or traditional view versus a revisionist view of how the Cold War came about. Gaddis argues that Stalin's personality plays an important role in sparking the conflict and so I initially thought this pointed to its non-inevitability. Rereading my notes on Schlesinger, however, I saw the strength of the inevitability argument. My conclusion is that: conflict was inevitable after WW2, but the Cold War was driven by variable (non-inevitable factors) like Stalin's personality...

The Second World War created the economic and political circumstances for tensions to develop between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In Poland and Germany it also provided the physical location for those tensions to come to a head. However, this essay will argue that the Cold War was not the inevitable result of WW2. Rather it grew out of resurfacing animosities and was driven by other factors, including the personality of its key actors.

After decades of separation, the Grand Alliance was formed by common interest in securing Germany’s surrender and in maintaining post-war cooperation to prevent the re-emergence of the German threat. (1) This sustained them through the WW2, despite U.S. and British unease over Soviet atrocities (c.f. Katyn (2)) and Stalin’s motives (The threat of a separate peace). The suspicion was mutual (Stalin’s belief that there was a delay in opening the second front) and arguably never let up.

In 1945, there was hope that the various interests of the wartime allies could be accommodated, for instance in a “three policemen” concept. (3) Relations, however, became further strained by actions that either side considered threatening to national security. Stalin grew suspicious as the U.S. and Britain came increasingly closer over Britain’s interests in the Mediterranean, while his failure to adhere to the Yalta promises rang alarm bells in Washington and London. The U.S.’s temporary nuclear monopoly also played a role. The defeat of Hitler then, meant the glue keeping the Grand Alliance together dissolved.

It is worth considering what each party wanted from the situation at the end of WW2 before asking whether they would inevitably collide.

As the war ended, Britain and the U.S.S.R. were counting the cost of the conflict in financial and human terms. Both countries continued to seek ways of shoring up their spheres of influence (as they had done in Yalta with the “naughty document” (4) – the percentages agreement”). Schlesinger makes the point that Britain, like the U.S.S.R, had probably always tended towards the spheres of influence concept. (5) Britain, which was about to lose India to independence in what started the decline of its empire, wanted to maintain its influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, primarily as a means of securing its economic interests there (through Suez Canal for instance), but also to keep intact its colonies in Africa and elsewhere. As Britain shifted closer towards the U.S. post Potsdam (6), the Cold War’s battle lines were forming. (7)

The United States sought an end to nationalist power politics and the notion of spheres of influence that it believed was responsible for two world wars. As Schlesinger notes, this conveniently ignored the U.S. influence in Latin America at the time. (8) Roosevelt, following Wilson, hoped to export the U.S. concept of universalism, a new world order based on the notions of self-determination and international, free market trade. There were also significant economic considerations. The Great Depression was fresh in U.S. memories and fearing another crash, Washington sought to put in place through the World Bank and IMF the means to stabilise Europe’s economy. This would lessen the risk of economic collapse spreading to the U.S. economy and also ensure that the conditions of hyperinflation and chronic unemployment that buoyed Hitler in the 1930s would not be repeated. There was also a sense of moral obligation to act in Europe, spurred on by pressure from the émigré lobbies in Washington. (9)

After a series of invasions via Poland, Stalin primarily sought to secure the Soviet borders and wished to do so by creating a belt of friendly nations to the west of the U.S.S.R. He also sought territory at the expense of Poland and ports in the Mediterranean. His nation had been decimated by the war and paid a high price in human and material costs. He sought reparations from Germany and was resentful of persistent resistance to the “liberating” Red Army in Poland. This ignored of course the appalling treatment meted out to the Poles, their resentment of the Molotov/Ribbentrop pact and their fear of emerging from one occupation to immediate succumb to another. Stalin, due in part to his inherent insecurity, never relinquished the notion of spheres of influence, meaning that a collision course with the U.S. was set. What is arguable is the extent to which his aim to control neighbouring countries was ideological (born of the notion of a permanent people’s revolution) or truly in defence of national security. (10)

The case of Poland showed that the fate of third nations was subordinated to domestic political interests and questions of national security. It was clear that Stalin was not going to accept a Polish government which could resist his influence (11) and that he would seek to secure the passage through Poland which had in the past been used to invade his country. (12) Britain and the United States equally stood to lose credibility at home if they did not act.

A realist explanation of the origins of the Cold War would identify the need for territorial expansion and an innate quest for power among the key players as the two main determinants behind the conflict. This would then imply that whatever efforts were made at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam by the three major powers to reach an agreement on the make-up of post-war Europe, their desires to exert or maintain control over countries beyond their borders would inevitably bring them into conflict.

Taking into account factors such as personality and the influence of domestic opinion mean that identifying the origins of the Cold War becomes more complicated. However, it is perhaps a more accurate reflection of the factors which escalated the tensions between the western allies and the U.S.S.R. into the Cold War.

As Young and Kent suggest the external projections of capitalism and communism were a reflection of their leaders’ needs to keep themselves in power. This points to the importance of domestic politics and leaders’ personalities when considering the origins of Cold War.

“Thus foreign policy goals reflect elite ambitions in the form of state preoccupations with power and expansion as linked to status rather than security. Domestic goals reflect elite needs to preserve the socio-economic order that secures their position and secures its acceptance through the portrayal of ideological challenges as external threats.” (13)

As Gaddis argues, the principal reason why the Grand Alliance crumbled was Stalin’s insistence on equating security with territory. (14) He argues that Stalin’s own personal insecurity permeated Soviet society and was also projected outwards in the form of an antagonistic and expansionary foreign policy. Not only did this bring the U.S.S.R. in to conflict with its former allies, but it also ironically increased the risk of insecurity in the Eastern European states which Stalin was attempting to secure. The hostility which the Red Army faced put Stalin and Communism on the defensive in those countries and demanded an iron-fisted rule which guaranteed that the U.S. could only oppose what was happening. This mismatch between the coercion needed by the Soviets and the U.S. methods caused an imbalance which only righted itself when the wall fell.

“The resulting asymmetry would account, more than anything else, for the origins, escalation, and ultimate outcome of the Cold War.” (15)

Stalin’s behaviour then was largely responsible for creating the conditions which led to the Cold War by provoking the U.S. to the point where they felt compelled to contain the perceived threat he presented. Gaddis argues that the U.S. delay in accepting this need for containment (16) shows that they were still willing to consider coexistence despite their long-held ideological differences.

In conclusion, the perceived needs of the various players and the circumstances they found themselves in 1945 can explain many of the sources of conflict. However, the Cold War was not the inevitable outcome of WW2 since the escalation in tensions required to reach that point was dependent on variable factors such as personality and domestic concerns.

(1) Young, J.W. and Kent, J, International Relations Since 1945, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 52
(2) The Katyn Massacre, Bruce Kennedy, CNN Interactive, http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/01/spotlight/index.html (accessed Sept. 29, 2006)
(3) Pechatnov, V O, (date??) The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain, online: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=321 (accessed 23/09/2006)
(4) Jenkins, R, Churchill, Pan, 2001, p. 760
(5) Schlesinger Jr, A., Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, 1967, pp.23-52
(6) Young, J.W. and Kent, J, ibid, p. 63
(7) Young, J.W. and Kent, J, ibid, p. 64 (After London: “The diplomatic battleground which was to become a Cold War was thus being laid out in power political terms.”)
(8) Schlesinger Jr, A., ibid
(9) Conversations from Yalta; source material from WiWM. F.D.R: "It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland."
(10) Young, J.W. and Kent, J, ibid, p. 27
(11) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, The Conferences of Cairo and Tehran, Dept. of State, Washington, 1961. (accessed via kcl.ac.uk on Sept. 23, 2006)
(12) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, Dept. of State, Washington, 1955. (reproduced in Young, J.W. and Kent, J. 2004)
(13) Young, J.W. and Kent, J., ibid, p. 23
(14) Gaddis, J.L., We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, 1997, Oxford University Press, p.15
(15) Gaddis, J.L., ibid, p.17
(16) Gaddis, J.L., ibid, p.22

Some thoughts from Unit 2.1

Another brain emptying post, I am afraid. These are some bits and bobs I thought might be of use in thinking about the influence that personality, or rather Stalin's personality (after Gaddis), plays.

Pechatnov
The article is significant in what it tells us about Soviet thinking at the end of the War, the implications this has for the argument of inevitable conflict and also the fact that the three diplomats findings were passed over by Molotov. One could draw the inference as result, like Gaddis, that it was Stalin not Soviets per se and not Communism, who contributed to the conflict.

The conclusions Pechatnov draws are that, to a greater or lesser extent, all three diplomats believe in the primacy of maintaining Soviet interests in terms of a sphere of influence over neighbouring countries. They are equally interested in a post-war solution to the German question, and indeed the Japanese question, which would see their wartime enemy incapacitated and enfeebled as a political entity or through economic reparations, or both.

Maisky wants a greater influence for Soviet interests in China and sees the U.S.S.R. as an increasingly important centre of gravity for neighbouring countries. Gromyko pushes the notion that U.S. universalism, seen from the Soviet standpoint as a thinly veiled attempt to prise open new markets and therefore feed the U.S. need for economic growth, would present opportunities to a Soviet bloc rich in raw materials but in need of external technical and financial support.

Most significantly, argues Pechatnov, is that, in a show of unity which ran counter to the thinking within in the Kremlin at various points during the war, the correspondents also maintain that the best means of achieving the Soviet Union’s post-war wishes is by continuing the wartime cooperation with the United States and Great Britain.

For this to work, however, each corner of the triangle has to be independent and not combine with another against the third -- this requires then that the U.S. and Britain will ultimately be at loggerheads with one another, the inevitable Anglo-American contradiction (or as others suggest Soviet fantasies of capitalist fratricide). That the opposite occurs is then an explanation for Cold War polarisation.

“This "three policemen" formula of cooperation was thought able to provide for the three major strategic imperatives of the USSR: keeping Germany and Japan down, keeping the Soviet Union in the big council of the world, and legitimizing the USSR's post-war borders and sphere of influence.

"This notion of a multilateral, realpolitische mindset among senior Soviet advisors at a key moment in the Cold War’s gestation, begs the questions of what might have happened if Molotov, let alone Stalin, truly took them by their word.” (1)

Instead, as Pechatnov notes, the influence of the three, which was arguably never that great, was on the wane shortly after the end of World War Two.

Schlesinger

This is not really related but it serves to show that the notion that personality has a significant role to play, may only really apply to non-democratic systems.

In his analysis of revisionist thinking, Schlesinger challenges the idea (from Alperowitz of Nuclear diplomacy) that F.D.R.’s death marks a shift in U.S. foreign policy when the relatively inexperienced (as Gaddis says ill-informed) Truman entered the Oval Office:

“While the idea that Truman reversed Roosevelt’s policy is tempting dramatically, it is a myth.”(2)

(1) Pechatnov, V O, (date??) The Big Three After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain, online: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=321 (accessed 23/09/2006)
(2) Schlesinger Jr, Arthur, Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, 1967, pp.23-52

Some early learning points

I know its early days, but I was thinking about learning experiences after working through the documentation from the first unit. I think if I note these down, then I will keep coming back to them and hopefully remember the damn things for next time!

Some early learning points:
-- when reading TAKE NOTES based on the text and not what you are thinking.
-- when reading WRITE DOWN THE PAGE REFERENCES.
-- its never too early to start reading.
-- read before you think.
-- think before you write.

Just had to get that off my chest before I could move on!!

The Fog of War

Finally, I got around to watching the The Fog of War, the 2003 documentary film based on an extended interview with Robert S. McNamara.

It has been criticised for not pushing the technocrat McNamara to confront his culpability in letting the Vietnam War continue. He argues that a) it was the president's decision, and that b) as ex-defense secretary and head of the World Bank he could not interfere or express himself even after leaving/being ejected from office.

It does, however, provide some -- at least for me -- interesting insights in to the relationships between JFK (and later LBJ) and McNamara and other key advisors. I was particularly interested to hear recordings of JFK's ExComm talking about the Cuban crisis and the fact that former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn (Tommy) Thompson, was able to sway JFK's thinking on Khrushchev's motives.

McNamara frankly admits that this "empathy with the enemy", one of the 11 lessons which film maker Errol Morris extracts from McNamara's recollections, was lacking in Vietnam.

Some quotes:

-- Quoting Khrushchev on Cuba: "We and you ought not to pull on the ends of a rope which you have tied the knots of war. Because the more the two of us pull, the tighter the knot will be tied."
-- "There will be no learning period with nuclear weapons; you make one mistake and you destroyed a nation."
-- "We saw Vietnam as an element of the Cold War and not what they saw it as: a civil war. We did not know them well enough to empathise with them."

And finally, this one:

Describing how his wife-to-be needed to order stationery before their wedding day and asked him what his middle initial S stood for:

McNamara: "It's Strange."
Wife: "I know it's strange. But what is it?"

More details, more pictures

In response to Sergio's requests that we add a bit more to these blogs, here are a couple of pictures of me in the Swiss mountains. This first one is above Lake Zug. It was freezing cold beneath the clouds and glorious on top.




Another of a different hike, this one in the Swiss engadine, in the deepest south of the country, nearly on the Italian border.



And one to go in the profile.

Browsers, bloglines and Refworks

I've been following the technical help threads with sympathy. Initially I was finding some conflicts between some of the software and my Mac's Safari browser. So I ditched it in favour of Firefox which is great. It has sensible bookmarks and a great tab system meaning you can have several things open at the same time, all within the same browser.

As a journalist, I also cannot believe that I wasn't using bloglines already -- I always knew that RSS feeds had the potential to be a useful device to keep tabs on what was going on my beat, but had never got around to setting one up. I have now and its proving very useful. Trouble is, I was too enthusiastic I think at the start and am going to have to trim down my subscriptions... I had 492 new posts to read this morning!

I completed both the Information Literacy and Induction modules. Information Literacy proved to be very useful. I was unsure what to expect but the various introductions it gives to the software and resources available are first class.

Having got to grips with the various pieces of software, I have started to explore the the rest of the resources that are available to us as distance learning students. It's pretty impressive.

Locating the Mats Berdal article was problematic until I realised there was a version of the journal that you didn't have to pay for. The others were easy to find on the database which suggests that the Information Literacy module had sunk in after all.

Broswing that led me to start digging around for journal articles relating to media and war, and war reporting, which is my real interest and what motivated to choose this course. There is plenty more out there too so its a good job I got the Refworks account to start storing them all I suppose. Like Stefan here I would be interested to hear what students who have had experience using refworks think of the system. The only time I have had to deal with a bibliography was as an undergrad and I had an electric typewriter.

All in all, an interesting first week!

Introduction

Hi and welcome to my blog.

My name is Tom. I am a 28-year-old journalist. I live and work in Berlin. I am originally from the UK but I've spent the past five or so years in Austria (Vienna), Switzerland (Zurich) and Germany (Frankfurt and now Berlin).

I am looking forward to studying again and have spent the last couple of weeks reading some of the texts recommended on the reading list. Another batch is on its way from amazon.co.uk as I write. Their second hand book service is great. As a result of all the books, I had to spend the weekend building a new desk (thank you, IKEA) to sit them all on.

So, now I'm ready: books piled up, laptop configured, blog created.

Look forward to speaking to you all.